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In 2018, Indonesia will celebrate the 20th anniversary of its democratization 
process that was augmented after the fall of long-term authoritarian president 
Suharto in May 1998. Since then, Indonesia has witnessed four legislative elec-
tions (1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014), which were generally welcomed as largely 
free and fair. However, the extent to which Indonesian politics in general – and 
elections specifically – are being dominated by money politics, patronage, and 
clientelism remains one of the main concerns of many scholars and observers 
(e.g., Aspinall, 2013; Hadiz & Robison, 2013; Mietzner, 2013; Robertson-Snape, 
1999; Simandjuntak, 2012; van Klinken, 2009). In this respect, it appears that 
the 2014 legislative elections marked a disturbing peak. In the introduction to 
their edited volume Electoral Dynamics in Indonesia1, Edward Aspinall and Mada 
Sukmajati describe the role money politics played in the 2014 elections as “the 
most ‘massive’ it had ever been” (p. 2).
The research presented in Aspinall’s and Sukmajati’s volume aims at “identi-
fying the chief mechanisms that Indonesian legislative candidates used to appeal 
to voters [in the 2014 legislative elections]” (p. ix). The volume originates from 
an impressive collaborative research project comprising 50, mostly Indonesian, 
researchers who observed the lead up to the 2014 national legislative elections 
in 20 of Indonesia’s 34 provinces.2 All in all, 1,500 interviews with candidates and 
campaigners were conducted and hundreds of campaign events observed.
The book comprises 23 chapters – a comprehensive introduction and 22 case 
studies that present empirical data from across Indonesia. In their introduction 
“Patronage and Clientelism in Indonesian Electoral Politics”, Aspinall and Suk-
majati give a brief overview of relevant works on patronage and clientelism in 
Indonesian politics, explain the research design and goals, summarize the main 
findings of the case studies, and last but not least, hint to limitations of the vol-
ume while pointing out desiderates for further research. 
In reviewing the literature on the role of patronage and clientelism in In-
donesian politics, the authors cite a wide range of publications that stress the 
key role of patronage and clientelist practices in Indonesian electoral as well as 
1 An Indonesian version of the edited volume was published in 2014.
2 The research was conducted in the frame of a larger research project on money politics in South-
east Asia, comprising Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines.
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party politics. At the same time, the authors criticize the limited knowledge that ex-
ists regarding the actual workings and functioning of such mechanisms as compared 
to other Southeast Asia countries (e.g., Thailand). Accordingly, the case studies pre-
sented in Chapters 13 to 16, describe in detail how vote buying actually works for the 
first time. 
Although the research underpinning the volume did not exclusively focus on pa-
tronage politics by legislative candidates, the authors conclude that “patronage dis-
tribution is the central mode of political campaigning in Indonesian legislative elec-
tions” (p. 5). This is not only supported by the findings of all 22 case studies presented 
in the volume but also illustrated by statements of candidates quoted in the introduc-
tion who, after the elections, publicly regretted their decision to refrain from hand-
ing out monetary incentives. But, what is it that actually made patronage feature so 
prominently in the 2014 elections? Aspinall and Sukmajati go into depth to find an-
swers to this question – which also is the main argument of the volume – by looking 
into the legal changes in the Indonesian elections legislation over the past 15 years. In 
its second3 democratic elections in 1999, Indonesia used a fully closed proportional 
representation system. In this system, the place of a candidate on the party list, and 
on the ballot paper accordingly, decided whether or not he or she would win a seat in 
an electoral district. Then, starting in 2009, Indonesia’s election legislation changed 
to a fully open-list proportional representation, which meant that the candidate who 
was able to accumulate the most individual votes in an electoral district would win 
the seat, provided that the party surpassed the electoral threshold. This led to the 
paradox that suddenly legislative candidates no longer see candidates from other 
parties as their main competitors but those coming from their own party ranks. In 
this logic, it became more rational for candidates to rely on highly individualist, not 
party-based campaign strategies and to pursue as many individual votes as possible.
In their analysis of the case studies assembled in the volume, Aspinall and Sukma-
jati offer a typology of different kinds of patronage that featured as reoccurring pat-
terns in the elections. They distinguish between (1) vote buying, (2) individual gifts, 
(3) services and activities, (4) club goods, and (5) pork barrel projects. Vote buying 
(1), here, is understood as the distribution of money or goods to voters with the ex-
pectation that beneficiaries would repay the favor with their vote. The case studies 
presented in Chapter 14 to 17 on rural East and Central Java not only describe thickly 
the actual practice of vote buying but also reveal that, in these areas, it seemed to be 
more common as well as more socially accepted than in other researched areas. In-
dividual gifts (2) consisted of different categories such as ‘election merchandise’ like 
calendars showing the candidate’s picture and name, food items like rice, clothing, 
or household items. These goods were both distributed on house-to-house visits and 
campaign events, either by the candidate him- or herself or by campaign teams. The 
authors admit that it is difficult to sharply distinguish between vote buying and indi-
vidual gifts. What is more important, though, is that many of the interviewed candi-
dates did not consider individual gift distribution as part of money politics. Services 
and activities (3) that were provided by candidates included sports competitions, 
community parties, prayer meetings, and cooking demonstrations, to name just a 
3 The first democratic Indonesian legislative elections were held in 1955 (Feith, 1957).
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few. This also included the ‘distribution’ of free health insurance or the assistance for 
voters to access government services such as health or scholarship programs. Club 
goods (4) were a kind of patronage that targeted social groups in a certain locality 
rather than individuals. They included, inter alia, donations for the renovation of 
public infrastructure or farming equipment. In many cases, candidates used com-
munity leaders as vote brokers to ensure the electoral support of their communities. 
Based on these insights, the authors conclude that many candidates considered club 
goods morally and legally superior to other forms of patronage but less reliable in 
garnering voters’ actual support. As opposed to all other forms of patronage, pork 
barrel projects are not funded privately but are “geographically targeted and publicly 
funded benefits in repayment of, or expectation of, political support” (p. 24). This 
meant that candidates promised to fund public programs in their electoral district 
paid by the so-called aspiration funds (dana aspirasi) that Indonesian legislators have 
on their disposal to respond to their constituencies’ ‘aspirations’.
The 22 case studies in the volume are mapped out like a ‘legislative journey’ from 
Aceh, the westernmost province of Indonesia, to the central highlands of Papua in 
the east of the archipelago state. All in all, they cover seven election campaigns on 
Sumatra, ten on Java, one on Kalimantan, two on Sulawesi, one in East Nusa Teng-
gara, and two in Papua. The editors decided to group the case studies geographically 
rather than thematically as similar patterns of election campaigning emerged in all of 
them. Furthermore, the research project focused especially on the effects of different 
social, political, and economic factors as well as constituency size on campaigning 
strategies. Accordingly, the case study sites vary not only regarding ethnic, religious, 
and social composition but also in terms of scale and scope: While some of them 
closely observed campaigning in only one or two electoral districts of a city (kota) or 
a district (kabupaten), others looked at dynamics in a whole district or even province. 
In addition, while some focused on the legislative races for a district parliament only, 
others compared races for all three legislative levels (national, provincial, district/city) 
in one locality.
Although the book appears to present an inventory of cases rather than a deep 
comparative analysis, without doubt its value lies in the thick description and docu-
mentation of vote buying, patronage, and clientelist dynamics in Indonesian elections 
at the grassroots in highly heterogeneous localities. The case studies are well struc-
tured and profoundly rich in original research material as well as references. Also, the 
book convincingly demonstrates that there seems to exist what could be termed a 
‘unity in diversity’ when it comes to the question of how prominently money politics, 
patronage, and clientelism actually feature in contemporary Indonesian politics. All 
studies assembled in this edited volume clearly conclude that money politics is con-
sidered to be a legitimate means to the end of electoral victory. Although no promise 
of winning the race exists for whoever spends most on the campaign, the findings of 
the case studies clearly indicate that there is a widespread believe all over Indonesia 
that electoral campaigns cannot be won without employing money politics, at least 
to a certain extent. Last but not least, although the richness of original and highly 
interesting fieldwork data assembled in this book speaks for itself, it becomes obvi-
ous to the reader that the volume comprises preliminary results of a larger research 
project, the outcomes of which are yet to be analyzed more comprehensively. It is 
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particularly these future insights, which everyone interested in Indonesia’s highly dy-
namic democratization process should definitely look forward to.
Gunnar Stange
University of Vienna

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